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We report two laboratory-acquired Brucella melitensis
infections that were shown to be epidemiologically related.
Blood culture isolates were initially misidentified because of
variable Gram stain results, which led to misdiagnoses and
subsequent laboratory exposures. Notifying laboratory per-
sonnel who unknowingly processed cultures from brucel-
losis patients is an important preventive measure.
T
he incidence of brucellosis may reach 200 per 100,000
population in some developing countries, but in the
United States brucellosis is a rare disease (1). Over the past
50 years, effective control of brucellosis in animals and
animal products in the United States has dramatically
reduced the number of infections (2). Because of the rari-
ty of cases, laboratory and medical personnel may not be
familiar with Brucella, its clinical manifestations, and its
laboratory characterization. 
Transmission of brucellosis occurs from ingesting,
directly contacting, or inhaling the organism. Exposures
most commonly occur by eating contaminated animal
products from disease-endemic areas (1). Other, less com-
mon routes include person-to-person transmission and
accidental infection with live animal vaccines (3,4).
Brucella species are classified as category B bioterrorism
threat agents, so use as a bioweapon must also be consid-
ered as a potential source of exposure (5).
Laboratory workers are at risk when handling speci-
mens containing Brucella species because of aerosol-gen-
erating procedures or accidents that may result in infection
of blood or conjunctiva (6). In fact, brucellosis is one of
the most common laboratory-acquired infections (6–14).
To identify Brucella spp. from blood cultures, laboratory
workers rely on the Gram stain as a preliminary test.
Brucella organisms are gram-negative coccobacilli and
may be present in high concentration in blood cultures
drawn early in the disease process. If the Gram stain is
misinterpreted, the organism may be misidentified, which
would result in misdiagnosis and potential opportunities to
expose laboratory personnel (10). 
From 1993 to 2002, five B. melitensis and three B.
abortus infections were reported in New York State, exclu-
sive of New York City. Of the eight reported cases, two
were laboratory-acquired, five resulted from ingesting
unpasteurized milk products from countries with endemic
disease, and one had an undetermined source of infection
(New York State Department of Health [NYSDOH],
unpub. data). We describe two cases of laboratory-
acquired brucellosis in New York State that were not
known to be related at the time of their diagnoses. Initial
isolates from blood cultures of an index patient and two
laboratory workers were incorrectly identified as contami-
nants, in part because of reporting of primary Gram stain
results as gram-positive and gram-variable. 
Case Reports
In early November 2001, a 57-year-old female labora-
tory worker (laboratory worker 1) began experiencing
nonspecific symptoms of malaise, vomiting, headache,
lower leg cramping, anorexia, and fever. One week after
onset of symptoms, she was evaluated for severe
headaches at a local emergency room, where cerebrospinal
fluid (CSF) and blood cultures were collected. The CSF
culture was negative. From the blood culture, small, gram-
positive bacilli were isolated and characterized as coryne-
form bacilli, which are usually interpreted as contaminants
of unknown clinical importance. Despite multiple hospital
admissions, the laboratory worker continued to have
symptoms, but her condition remained undiagnosed.
Approximately 5 weeks after symptom onset, colleagues
from the hospital microbiology laboratory where she was
employed (laboratory 1) drew her blood for culture again.
After 5 days of incubation, gram-variable coccobacilli,
later identified as Brucella spp., were isolated.
Subculturing and biochemical tests were conducted in a
class II biosafety cabinet. The Brucella serum agglutina-
tion test (SAT) was reactive (1:640) at the NYSDOH lab-
oratory, Wadsworth Center. Laboratory worker 1 was
initially treated with doxycycline and gentamicin, fol-
lowed by doxycycline and rifampin, for 6 weeks of outpa-
tient therapy. The isolate was later identified as B.
melitensis by the Wadsworth Center and confirmed by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The patient
has not relapsed 18 months after completing treatment.
In a second incident in mid-January 2002, a 48-year-old
woman had nocturnal temperature spikes to 40°C, chills,
drenching sweats, and weight loss. Initially, she had a
diagnosis of influenza and was treated with oseltamivir
phosphate. Symptoms persisted, and uveitis developed. In
early March 2002, a diffuse, erythematous rash appeared
on the anterior aspect of both legs. A blood culture and
serologic tests for Lyme disease, ehrlichiosis, and Rocky
Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) were performed. From the
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RMSF titers were immunoglobulin (Ig) M-negative with a
reactive IgG of 1:256. Her physician prescribed 3 weeks of
doxycycline for RMSF, and the fevers resolved.
Subsequently, she was referred to an infectious disease
specialist, who found repeat RMSF titers unchanged,
which made acute RMSF unlikely. Additional testing iden-
tified a reactive Brucella SAT (1:640). When interviewed
by NYSDOH staff, the patient reported that she was a lab-
oratory worker (laboratory worker 2) at laboratory 2. Her
initial blood culture specimen, which had originally been
identified as Micrococcus, was reassessed by the commer-
cial laboratory. The commercial laboratory referred the
original isolate to the Wadsworth Center, where the isolate
was identified as B. melitensis. 
No evidence of exposure to Brucella spp., other than
through occupational exposure, was identified for either
laboratory worker. They denied traveling outside of the
United States, consuming imported or domestic unpasteur-
ized dairy products, knowing ill family or friends who may
have traveled, attending events with potentially contami-
nated foods, or handling farm or laboratory animals. Both
laboratory workers denied any accidental contamination or
spills in the laboratory during the 6 months before their
respective illnesses. Site visits to laboratories 1 and 2 were
conducted by NYSDOH. On the open bench at laboratory
1, blood cultures were routinely subcultured onto agar. A
syringe was used to directly plate contents of the blood
culture media bottle onto agar. A Gram stain was then per-
formed with additional contents from the syringe. The
stain was fixed in an incubator. Subsequent biochemical
tests, including a catalase test, which may generate
aerosols by introducing hydrogen peroxide to the speci-
men, were performed on the open laboratory bench. At lab-
oratory 2, subculturing occurred in a similar manner, but it
took place in a class II biosafety cabinet. However, bio-
chemical tests were performed on the open laboratory
bench when Gram stain results indicated that spores were
not present. Laboratory workers 1 and 2 wore gloves when
processing specimens, and both denied having dermatitis
or skin lesions on their hands. 
After the diagnosis of brucellosis in these two laborato-
ry workers, serum samples from their co-workers from
laboratories 1 and 2 were tested by Brucella SAT; samples
from seven of eight co-workers were nonreactive (<1:20).
A co-worker of laboratory worker 1 had an initial aggluti-
nation titer of 1:40 (indeterminate) and 1 month later had a
repeat titer of <1:20; she denied having symptoms. 
To determine the source of these laboratory workers’
infections, each laboratory reviewed Gram stains of blood
culture specimens processed within 3 to 6 months of symp-
tom onset. Laboratory worker 2 reviewed prior Gram stain
slides from laboratory 2 and identified one slide containing
a questionable coryneform bacillus. The Gram stain had
originated from the blood culture of laboratory worker 1.
This blood culture had been drawn from laboratory work-
er 1 during her visit to the emergency room of laboratory
worker 2’s hospital, early in November 2001.
Approximately 2 months before her illness, laboratory
worker 2 had personally processed laboratory worker 1’s
blood culture but had characterized the isolate as coryne-
form bacilli. Wadsworth Center staff reviewed the original
Gram stain from laboratory worker 1’s blood culture spec-
imen and noted gram-variable organisms with similar size
and shape to Brucella organisms. No isolate was available
for confirmation. However, laboratory worker 2 did not
identify any other Gram stains that resembled Brucella
organisms during the period before her illness.
The likely source of laboratory worker 1’s infection
was found after reassessing Gram stains performed in lab-
oratory 1 in August, September, and October 2001. A 76-
year-old woman visited the emergency room served by
laboratory 1 in early September 2001. The patient had had
fever (temperature 38.3ºC) for 1 day and headache for 3
weeks. She received one dose of ciprofloxacin for a possi-
ble urinary tract infection and was discharged. After 4 days
of incubation, a Gram stain of this patient’s blood culture
specimen showed tiny, gram-negative coccobacilli, report-
ed as coryneform bacilli. As part of the investigation for
the source of infection for laboratory worker 1, this
patient’s prepared Gram stain slide was referred to the
Wadsworth Center, where small, gram-variable cocci were
identified. More than 1 year after being seen in the emer-
gency room, this patient was offered Brucella SAT and a
repeat blood culture. She refused Brucella SAT, and her
physician did not identify symptoms consistent with bru-
cellosis. Six months after this identification, further exper-
imental analysis by the Wadsworth Center with
polymerase chain reaction tests performed on Gram stain
material detected B. melitensis DNA (Wadsworth Center,
NYSDOH, unpub. data). The patient was again contacted,
and Brucella SAT (>1.5 years after her initial blood cul-
ture) showed a titer of 1:80 (indeterminate). Repeat blood
cultures were negative. Upon interview, the patient denied
any visits outside the United States since 1989, when she
emigrated from Peru. She also denied consuming any
unpasteurized products from the United States or abroad.
An additional interview was scheduled, but the patient
died unexpectedly.
Conclusions
Although brucellosis is a rare disease in the United
States, its potential use as a bioweapon highlights the need
for accurate and rapid identification (15). In this investiga-
tion, brucellosis was diagnosed weeks to years after initial
Laboratory-acquired Brucellosis
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 10, No. 10, October 2004 1849positive blood cultures were misidentified, and laboratory
personnel were unknowingly exposed to the organism. 
This investigation suggests that transmission occurred
from the 76-year-old index patient to laboratory worker 1,
on the basis of B. melitensis DNA found in the Gram stain
material. Processing the index patient’s blood culture spec-
imen on an open laboratory bench was most likely the rea-
son for laboratory worker 1’s illness approximately 5
weeks later. The same mechanism of transmission proba-
bly occurred when laboratory worker 2 handled laboratory
worker 1’s blood culture specimen on the open bench for
biochemical testing. In these instances, blood culture bot-
tle media were transferred to slides and agar without much
risk for aerosolization, since contents were manipulated
with a syringe. Biochemical tests, however, included the
catalase test, which creates bubbles as a result of exposure
to 3% hydrogen peroxide in positive specimens. Brucella
spp. are known to be catalase positive. Neither laboratory
worker could identify any other possible sources of infec-
tion, and because brucellosis is a rare disease in New York,
the connection between these three patients is plausible.
With the initial interpretations of these Gram stains as
gram-variable, which resulted in misidentification of the
organism by three different laboratories, NYSDOH initiat-
ed an effort to educate clinical laboratories in New York
State about the potential difficulties in characterizing the
organism and the importance of primary Gram stain inter-
pretation. Additional investigation into the staining proper-
ties of Brucella spp. under various conditions is now in
progress and may help differentiate Brucella spp. from
other organisms. 
Because of immigration and foreign travel, brucellosis
remains an occupational hazard for laboratory personnel,
even in industrialized countries where animal control
efforts have virtually eliminated the disease. Because of
the nonspecific symptoms and the rarity of the disease in
the United States, healthcare providers may not consider
brucellosis in a differential diagnosis. However, eliciting
travel and occupational histories may assist in diagnosis.
Moreover, improved communication among healthcare
providers and laboratory personnel should facilitate
prompt and accurate identification and appropriate han-
dling of the organism. Its potential use as a bioweapon
necessitates that healthcare providers, as well as microbi-
ologists in hospitals and commercial laboratories, be
knowledgeable about the diagnosis, identification, and
handling of Brucella spp. 
Reporting brucellosis cases to public health officials is
another component in protecting others from this disease.
Public health officials should notify laboratory personnel
who may have handled cultures taken from patients
ultimately diagnosed with brucellosis. Early notification of
exposed personnel could lead to their timely diagnosis and
treatment, should symptoms occur, and could prevent fur-
ther laboratory exposures. 
At the time of this report, Dr. Noviello was an epidemic
intelligence service officer at the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention working at the New York State Department of Health.
Her projects included an evaluation of short-course latent tuber-
culosis infection treatment among inmates and investigations of
foodborne outbreaks in New York State.
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